Search costs and corporate income tax competition by Konrad, Kai A.
www.ssoar.info
Search costs and corporate income tax competition
Konrad, Kai A.
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
SSG Sozialwissenschaften, USB Köln
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Konrad, K. A. (2010). Search costs and corporate income tax competition. (Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum
Berlin für Sozialforschung, Schwerpunkt Märkte und Politik, Forschungsprofessur und Projekt The Future of Fiscal
Federalism, 2010-11). Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH. https://nbn-resolving.org/
urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-238399
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
 
 
 
 
 WISSENSCHAFTSZENTRUM BERLIN 
 FÜR SOZIALFORSCHUNG 
 
 SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH 
 CENTER BERLIN 
 
  
 
 
Research Area 
Markets and Politics 
Research Professorship & Project 
"The Future of Fiscal Federalism" 
Schwerpunkt 
Märkte und Politik 
Forschungsprofessur & Projekt 
"The Future of Fiscal Federalism" 
 
Kai A. Konrad 
 
Search Costs and Corporate Income Tax Competition 
 
 
 Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property,  
Competition and Tax Law and WZB 
 
 SP II 2010 – 11 
August 2010  
 
 ii 
  
 
Kai A. Konrad, Search Costs and Corporate Income Tax 
Competition, Discussion Paper SP II 2010 – 11, 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin, 2010. 
 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH, 
Reichpietschufer 50, 10785 Berlin, Germany, Tel. (030) 2 54 91 – 0 
Internet:  www.wzb.eu  
 iii 
ABSTRACT 
Search Costs and Corporate Income Tax Competition    
by Kai A. Konrad * 
This paper studies corporate tax competition if it is costly to learn some of the 
elements that determine the effective tax burden. Search cost may, but need 
not, eliminate the tax competition pressure. The outcome depends on the 
boundaries of tax rate and tax base choices. Search cost can explain the 
empirically observed tax cuts cum base broadening. 
 
Keywords: Costly search, tax competition, corporate taxation, monopoly pricing 
paradox 
 
JEL classification: H70, H87 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Suchkosten und Körperschaftssteuerwettbewerb  
Dieser Artikel untersucht den Körperschaftssteuerwettbewerb und insbesondere 
die Frage, ob es kostspielig ist, einige der Elemente in Erfahrung zu bringen, 
welche die effektive Steuerbelastung bestimmen. Suchkosten können, müssen 
aber nicht, den Druck des Steuerwettbewerbs aufheben. Das Resultat hängt 
von der Wahl der Steuerfreigrenzen und der Steuerbemessungsgrundlage ab. 
Suchkosten können die empirisch beobachteten Steuersenkungen, verbunden 
mit der Verbreiterung der Steuerbemessungsgrundlage, erklären.      
 
                                                 
*  I thank Gerold Krause-Junk for making me interested in the role of tax base uncertainty and Aron Kiss 
for helpful suggestions. The usual caveat applies.  
 
 
1 Introduction
This paper introduces search cost in the theory of tax competition. It stud-
ies tax competition in search markets for foreign direct investors when the
statutory tax rates are known but the e¤ective tax base is not known, caus-
ing search costs to rms which are trying to nd out countries e¤ective
tax burdens prior to the investment location choice.1 Tax rates of di¤erent
countries are typically well advertised and known or are accessible virtually
without cost. It is much more di¢ cult to learn the details of a countrys tax
rules, such as depreciation allowances, tax treatment of R&D investment,
treatment of capital gains, the integration of corporate taxation with other
elements of the national tax system, a countrys nancial regulation and its
rules regarding transfer pricing. A rm needs to know and to assess what
these rules imply for tax optimization and for the resulting e¤ective tax base
for a given investment project.2 We nd: as a variant of Diamonds (1971)
monopoly pricing paradox3, the cost of learning countriese¤ective tax base
has drastic consequences for the equilibrium outcome of tax competition.4
From a structural point of view, Harrington and Leahey (2007) is closest to
our paper. They consider price competition between rms with unobserved
delivery costs adding to sales prices. In our framework, countries compete
for rms, and the (observed) tax rate and the (unobserved) tax base inter-
1For a recent survey of this large literature see Fuest, Huber and Mintz (2005). Search
cost is not an issue that has been considered in this literature.
2As stated by the European Commission (2001, p.37): "[...] each Member State has
its own sets of rules, in particular laws and conventions on nancial accounting, rules
for determining taxable prot, arrangements for collection and administration of tax and
its own network of tax treaties. The need to comply with a multiplicity of di¤erent rules
entails a considerable compliance cost and represents in itself a signicant barrier to cross-
border economic activity."
3Many variants of this Diamond paradox have been explored. Burdett and Judd (1983)
analyzed a more general framework in which some rms may be informed about the prices
in multiple rms, and showed that this may lead to an equilibrium with price dispersion,
instead of monopoly pricing. More recent contributions are McAfee (1995), Baye and
Morgan (2001), Arbatskaya (2007), Ireland (2007) who considers rms which sell through
di¤erent outlets. Harrington (2001) considers competition in which price and quality are
uncertain, with a high search cost for quality and a low search cost for the price.
4Unlike in Fuest (1995) who considers tax competition with redundancy of tax instru-
ments, tax rate and tax base are not perfect substitutes here, as they di¤er by the aspect
of search cost.
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act multiplicatively. We show that competition pressure may occur, despite
the existence of search cost, depending on the size of the minimum feasible
tax base. Our results show why competition can lead to a tax-cut-cum-
base-broadening and explain this recent trend in the context of corporate
taxation. It contributes a further explanation for the puzzle5 as to why cor-
porate tax rates dropped in the last 25 years in OECD countries, whereas
tax revenues from corporate taxation were sustained.6
2 The formal framework
We look for (weak) perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the following game
with complete, but imperfect, information. There are n ex-ante identi-
cal countries j = 1; :::; n, and a set of investors i with measure 1.7 Each
country chooses a statutory tax rate tj 2 [0; 1]  [0; 1] and a tax base
bj 2 [0; 1]  [0; 1]. The product of tax rate and tax base in a country is
called the e¤ective tax burden and denoted
Tj = tjbj : (1)
This Tj is the scal price which investors have to pay for investing in country
j: Each investor maximizes his net prot. He costlessly observes the statu-
tory tax rates t1; :::; tn. The e¤ective tax bases b1; :::; bn are determined by
a large number of details in the tax code such as depreciation rules or cost
deduction allowances, the conduct of the tax administration, for instance,
regarding transfer pricing issues or auditing habits, on specic characteris-
tics of the investment project and its exibility for tax optimization in the
respective institutional framework. Evidently, bj should be understood as a
metaphor for the less easily observable co-determinants of e¤ective tax bur-
den. To learn the actual bj of country j the investor has a positive cost that
is equal to c > 0. To learn the tax bases of a set Ki  f1; :::; ng of countries,
5See Sørensen (2007) and De Mooij and Nicodème (2008) for a balanced discussion.
6Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano (2008), for instance, report a drop in the average
of the statutory rates of corporate taxation in the OECD countries from about 50 percent
to under 35 percent in the period between the early Eighties and 2001. Devereux, Gri¢ th
and Klemm (2002) provide evidence for sustained tax revenue, despite these drops in rates.
7We deliberately choose a framework in which the di¤erent countries are as homogenous
as possible along all dimensions ex ante, before choosing their tax burdens. Without search
costs, this framework would yield a race to the bottom.
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the search cost is equal to (#Ki)c, with #Ki the number of countries in
Ki. For these countries j 2 Ki, investor i knows the e¤ective tax burden
Tj . For all j =2 Ki, i must form a belief about Tj , described by a (possibly
degenerate) probability distribution Fj(Tj). Each investor invests one unit
of capital (or does not invest at all).8 The investment turns into a gross
prot of size (Tj). For this function, we assume that a higher tax rate
reduces this gross prot. More precisely, (0) is the laissez-faireprot, 
is a concave function of Tj (i.e., 0 < 0 and 00  0) in the range Tj 2 [0; 1]
and zero for Tj > 1. Intuitively, this is a short-hand notion for the idea that
rms adjust their local business activity to taxation, that their activity will
be negatively a¤ected by a higher e¤ective tax burden, and that rms have
an exit option, which rules out an innitely high tax burden. The gross
prot  is subject to the e¤ective tax burden. Hence, the prot net of taxes
and net of search costs for the investor i who expends (#Ki)c units of search
costs and invests in country j is
(1  tjbj)(tjbj)  (#Ki)c. (2)
Each government maximizes its tax revenues.9 If j 2 (0; 1) is the share of
investors who invest in country j, then the tax revenue in country j is
jtjbj(tjbj) (3)
where j can, in general, be a function of ((t1; b1); :::; (tn; bn))
We consider the following timing. Stage 1: the countries choose their
statutory tax rates and their tax base denitions. Stage 2: the investors
choose which information they will acquire about tax base denitions. Stage
3: investment choices take place.
It is useful to dene the following benchmark: in the absence of tax
competition, j is exogenous. This makes (3) a monotonic and concave
function of the e¤ective tax burden and has a unique maximum that is
implicitly dened by the rst-order condition
Tj
0(Tj) + (Tj) = 0. (4)
8 It is possible that the investor does not invest at all, but we will not consider this con-
straint explicitly in what follows, as it will not be binding under fairly general conditions.
9This is a standard assumption and may describe Leviathan government or a benevolent
government that may want to extract revenue from non-resident investors on behalf of its
population.
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We denote the solution to (4) as Tm and call Tm the e¤ective monopoly tax.
Proposition 1 The following strategy prole and beliefs constitute a weak
perfect Bayesian equilibrium: (i) For 01 < Tm : All countries choose
tj = 0 and bj = 1. Investors believe that
bj = 1 for tj  Tm=1
bj = Tm=tj for tj 2 (Tm=1; Tm=0]
bj = 0 for tj > Tm=0
(5)
with probability 1. They choose Ki = ? and invest in one of the countries
with the (according to the beliefs) lowest e¤ective tax burden. (ii) For 01 
Tm  00 : All countries choose tjbj with tj 2 [0; 1], bj 2 [0; 1] such
that tjbj = Tm. Investors i believe that
tjbj = Tm for tj 2 [Tm=1; Tm=0]
tjbj = tj0 > Tm for tj > Tm=0:
(6)
with probability 1. They choose Ki = ? and invest in one of the countries
with the lowest (believed) e¤ective tax burden.
Proof. (i) In stage 3, each investor i knows bj for j 2 Ki and has beliefs
(5) about countriesbj for j =2 Ki. The investor chooses the country with
the lowest tjbj and randomizes between the di¤erent countries if there are
several countries with the same e¤ective tax burden. In stage 2, each investor
i observes t1; :::; tn and choosesKi. Given that the beliefs (5) are degenerate,
the investor does not expect to learn anything from search. Hence, Ki =
?. Turning to stage 1, for tk = 0; bk = 1 for all k 6= j, the country j
chooses (tj ; bj) to maximize (3). For tj > 0 and given the beliefs in (5),
all investors expect the scal burden to be higher in this country than in
the other countries. The country receives a tax revenue equal to zero in the
continuation game. For tj = 0, its expected tax revenue is equal to
1
n
(0bj)(0bj) (7)
and, as 01 < Tm, this reaches its maximum for bj = 1. Note also that
the beliefs are consistent along the equilibrium path.
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The reasoning for case (ii) is analogous for stages 2 and 3. In stage 1,
countries anticipate that Ki = ?. Given the simultaneous choices tkbk = Tm
for k 6= j, country j anticipates that js tax revenue is equal to
1
n tjbj(tjbj) if tj 2 [Tm=1; Tm=0]
0 if tj > Tm=0.
(8)
Accordingly, j chooses tj 2 [Tm=1; Tm=0] and a tax burden denition that
maximizes tjbj(tjbj) for this tj . This maximand is bj = Tm=tj . Note also
that the beliefs are consistent along the equilibrium path.
Cases (i) and (ii) have in common that no search costs are incurred.
Given the expectations of identical equilibrium e¤ective tax base choices in
the di¤erent countries, a costly search does not pay. In turn, because no rm
searches, countries cannot attract additional investors by the choice of a low
e¤ective tax base. If the rms could commit to search actively, this would
introduce competitive pressure, as a country j that reduces bj is rewarded
with additional investment. Such search is, however, not time consistent. As
a result, competitive pressure is limited for case (i) and vanishes completely
for case (ii).
In case (ii) the tax burdens are equal to the tax burdens in autarchy.
This result closely corresponds with the original result in Diamond (1971)
and the recent result on additive two-component prices by Harrington and
Leahey (2007).
The more important result is for case (i). It shows that, despite the
absence of search in the equilibrium, the costless observability of the tax
rate exerts some partial competitive pressure on the e¤ective tax burdens.
As the tax base is bounded from above, the maximum possible e¤ective tax
burden can credibly be limited by the country if it chooses a tax rate that
is so small that the product of this tax rate with the maximum possible
(unobserved) tax base is smaller than the e¤ective monopoly tax (i.e., if
01 < Tm). For 0 = 0 even the full race to the bottom occurs. Note
also that the equilibrium in case (i) has very low tax rates, combined with
broad tax bases. This property is in line with the stylized facts on tax rate
reductions and tax base broadening.
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3 Conclusions
Search cost for the e¤ective tax burden is typically assumed away in tax
competition analysis. However, if there is a cost to learning the true size of
some of the determinants of the actual e¤ective tax burden, this may limit
the amount of competition pressure and may even support a tax compe-
tition equilibrium in which countries choose the e¤ective tax burden that
maximizes tax revenue, just as in the case with autarchy. The result is com-
patible with a large variety of combinations of tax rates and tax bases and
may add to the existing explanations for why the trend towards lower statu-
tory tax rates occurred in parallel with the increase in international openness
in recent decades, and why it was complemented with a broadening of the
corporate tax base.
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